Loss Distribution Approach for Operational Risk Capital Modelling under
  Basel II: Combining Different Data Sources for Risk Estimation by Shevchenko, Pavel V. & Peters, Gareth W.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
6.
18
82
v1
  [
q-
fin
.R
M
]  
8 J
un
 20
13
Loss Distribution Approach for Operational Risk
Capital Modelling under Basel II: Combining Different
Data Sources for Risk Estimation
Pavel V. Shevchenko
(corresponding author)
CSIRO Mathematics, Informatics and Statistics, Australia
School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of New South Wales, Australia
Locked Bag 17, North Ryde, NSW, 1670, Australia; e-mail: Pavel.Shevchenko@csiro.au
Gareth W. Peters
Department of Statistical Science, University College London
CSIRO Mathematics, Informatics and Statistics, Australia; email: gareth.peters@ucl.ac.uk
Draft, this version: 10 March 2013
Abstract
The management of operational risk in the banking industry has undergone significant
changes over the last decade due to substantial changes in operational risk environment.
Globalization, deregulation, the use of complex financial products and changes in in-
formation technology have resulted in exposure to new risks very different from market
and credit risks. In response, Basel Committee for banking Supervision has developed
a regulatory framework, referred to as Basel II, that introduced operational risk cate-
gory and corresponding capital requirements. Over the past five years, major banks in
most parts of the world have received accreditation under the Basel II Advanced Mea-
surement Approach (AMA) by adopting the loss distribution approach (LDA) despite
there being a number of unresolved methodological challenges in its implementation.
Different approaches and methods are still under hot debate. In this paper, we review
methods proposed in the literature for combining different data sources (internal data,
external data and scenario analysis) which is one of the regulatory requirement for
AMA.
Keywords: operational risk; loss distribution approach; Basel II.
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1 Operational Risk under Basel II
The management of operational risk in the banking industry has undergone significant
changes over the last decade due to substantial changes in operational risk environment.
Globalization, deregulation, the use of complex financial products and changes in informa-
tion technology have resulted in exposure to new risks very different from market and credit
risks. In response, Basel Committee for banking Supervision has developed a regulatory
framework, referred to as Basel II [1], that introduced operational risk (OpRisk) category
and corresponding capital requirements against OpRisk losses. OpRisk is defined by Basel
II [1, p.144] as: “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people
and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strate-
gic and reputational risk.” Similar regulatory requirements for the insurance industry are
referred to as Solvency 2. A conceptual difference between OpRisk and market/credit risk
is that it represents a downside risk with no upside potential.
OpRisk is significant in many financial institutions. Examples of extremely large OpRisk
losses are: Barings Bank in 1995 when the actions of one rogue trader caused a bankruptcy
as a result of GBP 1.3 billion derivative trading loss; Enron bankruptcy in 2001 considered
as a result of actions of its executives with USD 2.2 billion loss; and Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale losses
of Euro 4.9 billion in 2008 due to unauthorized trades. In 2012, a capital against OpRisk
in major Australian banks is about AUD 1.8-2.5 billion (8-10% of the total capital). Under
the Basel II framework, three approaches can be used to quantify the OpRisk annual capital
charge C, see [1, pp.144-148].
• The Basic Indicator Approach: C = α 1
n
∑3
j=1max(GI(j), 0), where GI(j), j =
1, . . . , 3 are the annual gross incomes over the previous three years, n is the number of
years with positive gross income, and α = 0.15.
• The Standardised Approach: C = 1
3
∑3
j=1max[
∑8
i=1 βiGIi(j), 0], where βi, i =
1, . . . , 8 are the factors for eight business lines (BL) listed in Table 1 and GIi(j),
j = 1, 2, 3 are the annual gross incomes of the i-th BL in the previous three years.
• The Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA): a bank can calculate the cap-
ital charge using internally developed model subject to regulatory approval.
A bank intending to use the AMA should demonstrate accuracy of the internal models within
the Basel II risk cells (eight business lines times seven risk types, see Table 1) relevant to
the bank and satisfy some criteria, see [1, pp.148-156], including:
• The use of the internal data, relevant external data, scenario analysis and factors
reflecting the business environment and internal control systems;
• The risk measure used for capital charge should correspond to the 99.9% confidence
level for a one-year holding period;
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• Diversification benefits are allowed if dependence modeling is approved by a regulator;
• Capital reduction due to insurance is capped by 20%.
The intention of AMA is to provide incentive to a bank to invest into development of
a sound OpRisk practices and risk management. The capital reserves under AMA (when
compared to other approaches) will be more relevant to the actual risk profile of a bank. It
is expected that the capital from the AMA is lower than the capital calculated under the
Standardised Approach (some regulators are setting a limit on this reduction, e.g. 25%).
The regulatory accreditation for AMA indicates to a market that a bank has developed a
sound risk management practice.
Basel II business lines (BL) Basel II event types (ET)
• Corporate finance (β1 = 0.18)
• Trading & Sales (β2 = 0.18)
• Retail banking (β3 = 0.12)
• Commercial banking (β4 = 0.15)
• Payment & Settlement (β5 = 0.18)
• Agency Services (β6 = 0.15)
• Asset management (β7 = 0.12)
• Retail brokerage (β8 = 0.12)
• Internal fraud
• External fraud
• Employment practices and
workplace safety
• Clients, products and business practices
• Damage to physical assets
• Business disruption and system failures
• Execution, delivery and
process management
Table 1: Basel II business lines and event types. β1, . . . , β8 are the business line factors used in
the Basel II Standardised Approach.
Remarks 1.1 While the regulatory capital for operational risk is based on the 99.9% con-
fidence level over a one year period, economic capital used by banks is often higher; some
banks use the 99.95%-99.98% confidence levels.
A popular method under the AMA is the loss distribution approach (LDA). Under the LDA,
banks quantify distributions for frequency and severity of OpRisk losses for each risk cell
(business line/event type) over a one-year time horizon. The banks can use their own risk
cell structure but must be able to map the losses to the Basel II risk cells. There are various
quantitative aspects of the LDAmodeling discussed in several books [2–7] and various papers,
e.g. [8–10] to mention a few. The commonly used LDA model for calculating the total annual
loss Z(t) in a bank (occurring in the years t = 1, 2, . . .) can be formulated as
Z(t) =
J∑
j=1
Zj(t); Zj(t) =
Nj(t)∑
i=1
X
(j)
i (t). (1)
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Here, the annual loss Zj(t) in risk cell j is modeled as a compound process over one year with
the frequency (annual number of events) Nj(t) implied by a counting process (e.g. Poisson
process) and random severities X
(j)
i (t), i = 1, . . . , Nj(t). Estimation of the annual loss
distribution by modeling frequency and severity of losses is a well-known actuarial technique
used to model solvency requirements for the insurance industry, see e.g. [11–13]. Then the
capital is defined as the 0.999 Value at Risk (VaR) which is the quantile of the distribution
for the next year total annual loss Z(T + 1):
V aRq[Z(T + 1)] = F
−1
Z(T+1)(q) = inf{z : Pr[Z(T + 1) > z] ≤ 1− q} (2)
at the level q = 0.999. Here, index T+1 refers to the next year and notation F−1Y (q)
denotes the inverse distribution of a random variable Y . The capital can be calculated as
the difference between the 0.999 VaR and expected loss if the bank can demonstrate that the
expected loss is adequately captured through other provisions. If correlation assumptions can
not be validated between some groups of risks (e.g. between business lines) then the capital
should be calculated as the sum of the 0.999 VaRs over these groups. This is equivalent to the
assumption of perfect positive dependence between annual losses of these groups. However,
it is important to note that the sum of VaRs across risks is not most conservative estimate
of the total VaR. In principle, the upper conservative bound can be larger; see Embrechts et
al [14] and Embrechts et al [15]. This is often the case for heavy tailed distributions (with
the tail decay slower than the exponential) and large quantiles.
The major problem in OpRisk is a lack of quality data that makes it difficult for advanced
research in the area. In past, most banks did not collect OpRisk data – it was not required
while the cost of collection is significant. Moreover, indirect OpRisk losses cannot be mea-
sured accurately. Also the duration of OpRisk events can be substantial and evaluation of
the impact of the event can take years.
Over the past five years, major banks in most parts of the world have received ac-
creditation under the Basel II AMA by adopting the LDA despite there being a number
of unresolved methodological challenges in its implementation. Different approaches and
methods are still under hot debate. One of the unresolved challenges is combining internal
data with external data and scenario analysis required by Basel II. In this paper, we review
some methods proposed in the literature to combine different data sources for OpRisk cap-
ital modelling. Other challenges not discussed in this paper include modelling dependence
between risks, handling data truncation, modelling heavy tailed severities, and estimation of
the frequency and severity distributions; for these issues, the readers are refereed to Panjer [5]
or Shevchenko [16].
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the requirements for the data
that should be collected and used for Basel II AMA. Combining different data sources using
ad-hoc and Baysian methods are considered in Sections 3–5. Other methods of combining,
non-parametric Bayesian method via Dirichlet process and Dempster’s combining rule are
considered in Section 6 and Section 7 respectively. To avoid confusion in description of
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mathematical concepts we follow a standard statistical notation denoting random variables
by upper case symbols and their realisations by lower case symbols.
2 Data Sources
Basel II specifies requirement for the data that should be collected and used for AMA. In
brief, a bank should have internal data, external data and expert opinion data. In addition,
internal control indicators and factors affecting the businesses should be used. A bank’s
methodology must capture key business environment and internal control factors affecting
OpRisk. These factors should help to make forward-looking estimation, account for the
quality of the controls and operating environments, and align capital assessments with risk
management objectives.
The intention of the use of several data sources is to develop a model based on the largest
possible dataset to increase the accuracy and stability of the capital estimate. Development
and maintenance of OpRisk databases is a difficult and challenging task. Some of the main
features of the required data are summarized as follows.
2.1 Internal data
The internal data should be collected over a minimum five year period to be used for capital
charge calculations (when the bank starts the AMA, a three-year period is acceptable). Due
to a short observation period, typically, the internal data for many risk cells contain few (or
none) high impact low frequency losses. A bank must be able to map its historical internal
loss data into the relevant Basel II risk cells in Table 1. The data must capture all material
activities and exposures from all appropriate sub-systems and geographic locations. A bank
can have an appropriate reporting threshold for internal data collection, typically of the
order of Euro 10,000. Aside from information on gross loss amounts, a bank should collect
information about the date of the event, any recoveries of gross loss amounts, as well as some
descriptive information about the drivers of the loss event.
2.2 External data
A bank’s OpRisk measurement system must use relevant external data. These data should
include data on actual loss amounts, information on the scale of business operations where the
event occurred, and information on the causes and circumstances of the loss events. Industry
data are available through external databases from vendors (e.g. Algo OpData provides
publicly reported OpRisk losses above USD 1 million) and consortia of banks (e.g. ORX
provides OpRisk losses above Euro 20,000 reported by ORX members). The external data
are difficult to use directly due to different volumes and other factors. Moreover, the data
have a survival bias as typically the data of all collapsed companies are not available. Several
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Loss Data Collection Exercises (LDCE) for historical OpRisk losses over many institutions
were conducted and their analyses reported in the literature. In this respect, two papers
are of high importance: [17] analysing 2002 LDCE and [18] analysing 2004 LDCE where the
data were mainly above Euro 10,000 and USD 10,000 respectively. To show the severity and
frequency of operational losses, Table 2 presents a data summary for 2004 LDCE conducted
by US Federal bank and Thrift Regulatory agencies in 2004 for US banks. Here, twenty
three US banks provided data for about 1.5 million losses totaling USD 25.9 billion. It is
easy to see that frequencies and severities of losses are very different across risk cells, though
some of the cells have very few and small losses.
2.3 Scenario Analysis
A bank must use scenario analysis in conjunction with external data to evaluate its exposure
to high-severity events. Scenario analysis is a process undertaken by experienced busi-
ness managers and risk management experts to identify risks, analyse past internal/external
events, consider current and planned controls in the banks; etc. It may involve: workshops
to identify weaknesses, strengths and other factors; opinions on the impact and likelihood of
losses; opinions on sample characteristics or distribution parameters of the potential losses.
As a result some rough quantitative assessment of risk frequency and severity distributions
can be obtained. Scenario analysis is very subjective and should be combined with the ac-
tual loss data. In addition, it should be used for stress testing, e.g. to assess the impact of
potential losses arising from multiple simultaneous loss events.
Expert opinions on potential losses and corresponding probabilities are often expressed
using opinion on the distribution parameter; opinions on the number of losses with the
amount to be within some ranges; separate opinions on the frequency of the losses and
quantiles of the severity; opinion on how often the loss exceeding some level may occur.
Expert elicitation is certainly one of the challenges in OpRisk because many managers and
employees may not have a sound knowledge of statistics and probability theory. This may
lead to misleading and misunderstanding. It is important that questions answered by experts
are simple and well understood by respondents. There are psychological aspects involved.
There is a vast literature on expert elicitation published by statisticians, especially in areas
such as security and ecology. For a good review, see O’Hagan [19]. However, published
studies on the use of expert elicitation for OpRisk LDA are scarce. Among the few are
Frachot et al [9]; Alderweireld et al [20]; Steinhoff and Baule [21]; and Peters and Hu¨bner [22].
These studies suggest that questions on “how often the loss exceeding some level may occur”
are well understood by OpRisk experts. Here, experts express the opinion that a loss of
amount L or higher is expected to occur every d years. A recently proposed framework
that incorporates scenario analysis into OpRisk modeling was proposed in Ergashev [23],
where the basis for the framework is the idea that only worst-case scenarios contain valuable
information about the tail behavior of operational losses.
6
Remarks 2.1 One of the problems with the combining external data and scenario analysis
is that external data are collected for Basel II risk cells while scenario analysis is done at the
loss process level.
2.4 A Note on Data Sufficiency.
Empirical estimation of the annual loss 0.999 quantile, using observed losses only, is impos-
sible in practice. It is instructive to calculate the number of data points needed to estimate
the 0.999 quantile empirically within the desired accuracy. Assume that independent data
points X1, . . . , Xn with common density f(x) have been observed. Then the quantile qα at
confidence level α is estimated empirically as Q̂α = X˜⌊nα⌋+1, where X˜ is the data sample X
sorted into the ascending order. The standard deviation of this empirical estimate is
stdev[Q̂α] =
√
α(1− α)
f(qα)
√
n
; (3)
see Glasserman [24, section 9.1.2, p. 490]. Thus, to calculate the quantile within relative
error ε = 2× stdev[Q̂α]/qα, we need
n =
4α(1− α)
ε2(f(qα)qα)2
(4)
observations. Suppose that the data are from the lognormal distribution LN (µ = 0, σ = 2).
Then using formula (4), we obtain that n = 140, 986 observations are required to achieve
10% accuracy (ε = 0.1) in the 0.999 quantile estimate. In the case of n = 1, 000 data points,
we get ε = 1.18, that is, the uncertainty is larger than the quantile we estimate. Moreover,
according to the regulatory requirements, the 0.999 quantile of the annual loss (rather than
0.999 quantile of the severity) should be estimated. OpRisk losses are typically modelled
by the heavy-tailed distributions. In this case, the quantile at level q of the aggregate
distributions can be approximated by the quantile of the severity distribution at level
p = 1− 1− q
E[N ]
;
see Embrechts et al [25, theorem 1.3.9]. Here, E[N ] is the expected annual number of events.
For example, if E[N ] = 10, then we obtain that the error of the annual loss 0.999 quantile is
the same as the error of the severity quantile at the confidence level p = 0.9999. Again, using
(4) we conclude that this would require n ≈ 106 observed losses to achieve 10% accuracy. If
we collect annual losses then n/E[N ] ≈ 105 annual losses should be collected to achieve the
same accuracy of 10%. These amounts of data are not available even from the largest external
databases and extrapolation well beyond the data is needed. Thus parametric models must
be used. For an excellent discussion on data sufficiency in OpRisk, see Cope et al [26].
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Table 2: Number of loss events (%, top value in a cell) and total Gross Loss (%, bottom value in a
cell) annualised per Business Line and Event Type reported by US banks in 2004 LDCE [27, tables
3 and 4]. 100% corresponds to 18,371.1 events and USD 8,643.2 million. Losses ≥ USD 10,000
occurring during the period 1999-2004 in years when data capture was stable.
ET(1) ET(2) ET(3) ET(4) ET(5) ET(6) ET(7) Other Fraud Total
BL(1)
0.01%
0.14%
0.01%
0.00%
0.06%
0.03%
0.08%
0.30%
0.00%
0.00%
0.12%
0.05%
0.03%
0.01%
0.01%
0.00%
0.3%
0.5%
BL(2)
0.02%
0.10%
0.01%
1.17%
0.17%
0.05%
0.19%
4.29%
0.03%
0.00%
0.24%
0.06%
6.55%
2.76%
0.05%
0.15%
7.3%
8.6%
BL(3)
2.29%
0.42%
33.85%
2.75%
3.76%
0.87%
4.41%
4.01%
0.56%
0.1%
0.21%
0.21%
12.28%
3.66%
0.69%
0.06%
2.10%
0.26%
60.1%
12.3%
BL(4)
0.05%
0.01%
2.64%
0.70%
0.17%
0.03%
0.36%
0.78%
0.01%
0.00%
0.03%
0.00%
1.38%
0.28%
0.02%
0.00%
0.44%
0.04%
5.1%
1.8%
BL(5)
0.52%
0.08%
0.44%
0.13%
0.18%
0.02%
0.04%
0.01%
0.01%
0.00%
0.05%
0.02%
2.99%
0.28%
0.01%
0.00%
0.23%
0.05%
4.5%
0.6%
BL(6)
0.01%
0.02%
0.03%
0.01%
0.04%
0.02%
0.31%
0.06%
0.01%
0.01%
0.14%
0.02%
4.52%
0.99%
5.1%
1.1%
BL(7)
0.00%
0.00%
0.26%
0.02%
0.10%
0.02%
0.13%
2.10%
0.00%
0.00%
0.04%
0.01%
1.82%
0.38%
0.09%
0.01%
2.4%
2.5%
BL(8)
0.06%
0.03%
0.10%
0.02%
1.38%
0.33%
3.30%
0.94%
0.01%
0.00%
2.20%
0.25%
0.20%
0.07%
7.3%
1.6%
Other
0.42%
0.1%
1.66%
0.3%
1.75%
0.34%
0.40%
67.34%
0.12%
1.28%
0.02%
0.44%
3.45%
0.98%
0.07%
0.05%
0.08%
0.01%
8.0%
70.8%
Total
3.40%
0.9%
39.0%
5.1%
7.6%
1.7%
9.2%
79.8%
0.7%
1.4%
0.7%
0.8%
35.3%
9.6%
0.8%
0.1%
3.2%
0.6%
100.0%
100.0%
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2.5 Combining different data sources
Estimation of low-frequency/high-severity risks cannot be done using historically observed
losses from one bank only. It is just not enough data to estimate high quantiles of the
risk distribution. Other sources of information that can be used to improve risk estimates
and are required by the Basel II for OpRisk AMA are internal data, relevant external data,
scenario analysis and factors reflecting the business environment and internal control systems.
Specifically, Basel II AMA includes the following requirement1 [1, p. 152]: “Any operational
risk measurement system must have certain key features to meet the supervisory soundness
standard set out in this section. These elements must include the use of internal data,
relevant external data, scenario analysis and factors reflecting the business environment and
internal control systems.”
Combining these different data sources for model estimation is certainly one of the main
challenges in OpRisk. Conceptually, the following ways have been proposed to process
different data sources of information:
• numerous ad-hoc procedures;
• parametric and nonparametric Bayesian methods; and
• general non-probabilistic methods such as Dempster-Shafer theory.
These methods are presented in the following sections. Methods of credibility theory,
closely related to Bayesian method are not considered in this paper; for applications in the
context of OpRisk, see [28]. For application of Bayesian networks for OpRisk, the reader is
referred to [29] and [30]. Another challenge in OpRisk related to scaling of external data
with respect to bank factors such as total assets, number of employees, etc is not reviewed
in this paper; interested reader is referred to a recent study Ganegoda and Evans [31].
3 Ad-hoc Combining
Often in practice, accounting for factors reflecting the business environment and internal
control systems is achieved via scaling of data. Then ad-hoc procedures are used to combine
internal data, external data and expert opinions. For example:
• Fit the severity distribution to the combined samples of internal and external data and
fit the frequency distribution using internal data only.
• Estimate the Poisson annual intensity for the frequency distribution as wλint + (1 −
w)λext, where the intensities λext and λint are implied by the external and internal data
respectively, using expert specified weight w.
1The original text is available free of charge on the BIS website www.BIS.org/bcbs/publ.htm.
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• Estimate the severity distribution as a mixture
w1FSA(x) + w2FI(x) + (1− w1 − w2)FE(x),
where FSA(x), FI(x) and FE(x) are the distributions identified by scenario analysis,
internal data and external data respectively, using expert specified weights w1 and w2.
• Apply the minimum variance principle, where the combined estimator is a linear com-
bination of the individual estimators obtained from internal data, external data and
expert opinion separately with the weights chosen to minimize the variance of the
combined estimator.
Probably the easiest to use and most flexible procedure is the minimum variance prin-
ciple. The rationale behind the principle is as follows. Consider two unbiased independent
estimators Θ̂(1) and Θ̂(2) for parameter θ, i.e. E[Θ̂(k)] = θ and Var[Θ̂(k)] = σ2k, k = 1, 2. Then
the combined unbiased linear estimator and its variance are
Θ̂tot = w1Θ̂
(1) + w2Θ̂
(2), w1 + w2 = 1, (5)
Var[Θ̂tot] = w
2
1σ
2
1 + (1− w1)2σ22. (6)
It is easy to find the weights minimising Var[Θ̂tot]: w1 = σ
2
2/(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2) and w2 = σ
2
1/(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2).
The weights behave as expected in practice. In particular, w1 → 1 if σ21/σ22 → 0 (σ21/σ22 is
the uncertainty of the estimator Θ̂(1) over the uncertainty of Θ̂(2)) and w1 → 0 if σ22/σ21 → 0.
This method can easily be extended to combine three or more estimators using the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Minimum variance estimator) Assume that we have Θ̂(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , K
unbiased and independent estimators of θ with variances σ2i = Var[Θ
(i)]. Then the linear es-
timator
Θ̂tot = w1Θ̂
(1) + · · ·+ wKΘ̂(K),
is unbiased and has a minimum variance if wi = (1/σ
2
i )/
∑K
k=1(1/σ
2
k). In this case, w1 +
· · ·+ wK = 1 and
Var[Θ̂tot] =
(
K∑
k=1
1
σ2k
)−1
.
This result is well known, for a proof, see e.g. Shevchenko [16, exercise problem 4.1]. It is
a simple exercise to extend the above principle to the case of unbiased estimators with known
linear correlations. Heuristically, minimum variance principle can be applied to almost any
quantity, including a distribution parameter or distribution characteristic such as mean,
variance or quantile. The assumption that the estimators are unbiased estimators for θ is
probably reasonable when combining estimators from different experts (or from expert and
internal data). However, it is certainly questionable if applied to combine estimators from
the external and internal data.
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4 Bayesian Method to Combine Two Data Sources
The Bayesian inference method can be used to combine different data sources in a consistent
statistical framework. Consider a random vector of data X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn)
′ whose joint
density, for a given vector of parameters Θ = (Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,ΘK)
′, is h(x|θ). In the Bayesian
approach, both observations and parameters are considered to be random. Then the joint
density is
h(x, θ) = h(x|θ)π(θ) = π(θ|x)h(x), (7)
where
• π(θ) is the probability density of the parameters, a so-called prior density func-
tion. Typically, π(θ) depends on a set of further parameters that are called hyper-
parameters, omitted here for simplicity of notation;
• π(θ|x) is the density of parameters given data X, a so-called posterior density;
• h(x, θ) is the joint density of observed data and parameters;
• h(x|θ) is the density of observations for given parameters. This is the same as a
likelihood function if considered as a function of θ, i.e. ℓx(θ) = h(x|θ);
• h(x) is a marginal density of X that can be written as h(x) = ∫ h(x|θ)π(θ)dθ.
For simplicity of notation, we consider continuous π(θ) only. If π(θ) is a discrete
probability function, then the integration in the above expression should be replaced
by a corresponding summation.
4.1 Predictive distribution
The objective (in the context of OpRisk) is to estimate the predictive distribution (frequency
and severity) of a future observation Xn+1 conditional on all available information X =
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn). Assume that conditionally, given Θ, Xn+1 and X are independent, and
Xn+1 has a density f(xn+1|θ). It is even common to assume that X1, X2, . . . , Xn, Xn+1 are
all conditionally independent (given Θ) and identically distributed. Then the conditional
density of Xn+1, given data X = x, is
f(xn+1|x) =
∫
f(xn+1|θ)π(θ|x)dθ. (8)
If Xn+1 and X are not independent, then the predictive distribution should be written as
f(xn+1|x) =
∫
f(xn+1|θ,x)π(θ|x)dθ. (9)
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4.2 Posterior distribution.
Bayes’s theorem says that the posterior density can be calculated from (7) as
π(θ|x) = h(x|θ)π(θ)/h(x). (10)
Here, h(x) plays the role of a normalisation constant. Thus the posterior distribution can
be viewed as a product of a prior knowledge with a likelihood function for observed data. In
the context of OpRisk, one can follow the following three logical steps.
• The prior distribution π(θ) should be estimated by scenario analysis (expert opinions
with reference to external data).
• Then the prior distribution should be weighted with the observed data using formula
(10) to get the posterior distribution π(θ|x).
• Formula (8) is then used to calculate the predictive distribution of Xn+1 given the data
X.
Remarks 4.1
• Of course, the posterior density can be used to find parameter point estimators. Typ-
ically, these are the mean, mode or median of the posterior. The use of the posterior
mean as the point parameter estimator is optimal in a sense that the mean square error
of prediction is minimised. For more on this topic, see Bu¨hlmann and Gisler [32, sec-
tion 2.3]. However, in the case of OpRisk, it is more appealing to use the whole
posterior to calculate the predictive distribution (8).
• So-called conjugate distributions, where prior and posterior distributions are of the
same type, are very useful in practice when Bayesian inference is applied. Below we
present conjugate pairs (Poisson-gamma, lognormal-normal) that are good illustrative
examples for modelling frequencies and severities in OpRisk. Several other pairs can
be found, for example, in Bu¨hlmann and Gisler [32]. In all these cases the posterior
distribution parameters are easily calculated using the prior distribution parameters
and observations. In general, the posterior should be estimated numerically using e.g.
Markov chain Monte Carlo methods, see Shevchenko [16, chapter 2].
4.3 Iterative Calculation
If the data X1, X2, . . . , Xn are conditionally (given Θ = θ) independent and Xk is dis-
tributed with a density fk(·|θ), then the joint density of the data for given θ can be written
as h(x|θ) =
n∏
i=1
fi(xi|θ). Denote the posterior density calculated after k observations as
πk(θ|x1, . . . , xk), then using (10), observe that
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πk(θ|x1, . . . , xk) ∝ π(θ)
k∏
i=1
fi(xi|θ)
∝ πk−1(θ|x1, . . . , xk−1)fk(xk|θ). (11)
It is easy to see from (11), that the updating procedure which calculates the posteriors
from priors can be done iteratively. Only the posterior distribution calculated after k-1
observations and the k-th observation are needed to calculate the posterior distribution after
k observations. Thus the loss history over many years is not required, making the model
easier to understand and manage, and allowing experts to adjust the priors at every step.
Formally, the posterior distribution calculated after k-1 observations can be treated as a prior
distribution for the k-th observation. In practice, initially, we start with the prior distribution
π(θ) identified by expert opinions and external data only. Then, the posterior distribution
π(θ|x) is calculated, using (10), when actual data are observed. If there is a reason (for
example, the new control policy introduced in a bank), then this posterior distribution can
be adjusted by an expert and treated as the prior distribution for subsequent observations.
4.4 Estimating Prior
In general, the structural parameters of the prior distributions can be estimated subjectively
using expert opinions (pure Bayesian approach) or using data (empirical Bayesian approach).
In a pure Bayesian approach, the prior distribution is specified subjectively (that is, in the
context of OpRisk, using expert opinions). Berger [33] lists several methods.
• Histogram approach: split the space of the parameter θ into intervals and specify the
subjective probability for each interval. From this, the smooth density of the prior
distribution can be determined.
• Relative Likelihood Approach: compare the intuitive likelihoods of the different values
of θ. Again, the smooth density of prior distribution can be determined. It is difficult
to apply this method in the case of unbounded parameters.
• CDF determinations : subjectively construct the distribution function for the prior and
sketch a smooth curve.
• Matching a Given Functional Form: find the prior distribution parameters assuming
some functional form for the prior distribution to match prior beliefs (on the moments,
quantiles, etc) as close as possible.
The use of a particular method is determined by a specific problem and expert experi-
ence. Usually, if the expected values for the quantiles (or mean) and their uncertainties are
estimated by the expert then it is possible to fit the priors.
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Often, expert opinions are specified for some quantities such as quantiles or other risk
characteristics rather than for the parameters directly. In this case it might be better to
assume some priors for these quantities that will imply a prior for the parameters. In general,
given model parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θn), assume that there are risk characteristics di = gi(θ),
i = 1, 2, . . . , n that are well understood by experts. These could be some quantiles, expected
values, expected durations between losses exceeding high thresholds, etc. Now, if experts
specify the joint prior π(d1, . . . , dn), then using transformation method the prior for θ1, . . . , θn
is
π(θ) = π(g1(θ), . . . , gn(θ))
∣∣∣∣∂ (g1(θ), . . . , gn(θ))∂ (θ1, . . . , θn)
∣∣∣∣ , (12)
where |∂ (g1(θ), . . . , gn(θ)) /∂ (θ1, . . . , θn)| is the Jacobian determinant of the transformation.
Essentially, the main difficulty in specifying a joint prior is due to a possible dependence
between the parameters. It is convenient to choose the characteristics (for specification of
the prior) such that independence can be assumed. For example, if the prior for the quantiles
q1, . . . , qn (corresponding to probability levels p1 < p2 < · · · < pn) is to be specified, then to
account for the ordering it might be better to consider the differences
d1 = q1, d2 = q2 − q1, . . . , dn = qn − qn−1.
Then, it is reasonable to assume independence between these differences and impose con-
straints di > 0, i = 2, . . . , n. If experts specify the marginal priors π(d1), π(d2), . . . , π(dn)
(e.g. gamma priors) then the full joint prior is
π(d1, . . . , dn) = π(d1)× π(d2)× · · · × π(dn)
and the prior for parameters θ is calculated by transformation using (12). To specify the
i-th prior π(di), an expert may use the approaches listed above. For example, if π(di) is
Gamma(αi, βi), then the expert may provide the mean and variational coefficient for π(di)
(or median and 0.95 quantile) that should be enough to determine αi and βi.
Under empirical Bayesian approach, the parameter θ is treated as a random sample
from the prior distribution. Then using collective data of similar risks, the parameters of
the prior are estimated using a marginal distribution of observations. Depending on the
model setup, the data can be collective industry data, collective data in the bank, etc. To
explain, consider K similar risks where each risk has own risk profile Θ(i), i = 1, . . . , K; see
Figure 1. Given Θ(i) = θ(i), the risk data X
(i)
1 , X
(i)
2 , . . . are generated from the distribution
F (x|θ(i)). The risks are different having different risk profiles θ(i), but what they have in
common is that Θ(1), . . . ,Θ(K) are distributed from the same density π(θ). Then, one can
find the unconditional distribution of the data X and fit the prior distribution using all
data (across all similar risks). This could be done, for example, by the maximum likelihood
method or the method of moments or even empirically. Consider, for example, J similar
risk cells with the data {X(j)k , k = 1, 2, . . . , j = 1, . . . , J}. This can be, for example, a
specific business line/event type risk cell in J banks. Denote the data over past years as
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X(j) = (X
(j)
1 , . . . , X
(j)
Kj
)′, that is, Kj is the number of observations in bank j over past years.
Assume that X
(j)
1 , . . . , X
(j)
Kj
are conditionally independent and identically distributed from
the density f(·|θj), for given Θ(j) = θ(j). That is, the risk cells have different risk profiles
Θj . Assume now that the risks are similar, in a sense that Θ(1), . . . ,Θ(J) are independent
and identically distributed from the same density π(θ). That is, it is assumed that the risk
cells are the same a priori (before we have any observations); see Figure 1. Then the joint
density of all observations can be written as
f(x(1), . . . ,x(J)) =
J∏
j=1
∫ Kj∏
k=1
f(x
(j)
k |θ(j))
 π(θ(j))dθ(j). (13)
The parameters of π(θ) can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method by max-
imising (13). The distribution π(θ) is a prior distribution for the j-th cell. Using internal
data of the j-th risk cell, its posterior density is calculated from (10) as
π(θ(j)|x(j)) =
Kj∏
k=1
f(x
(j)
k |θ(j))π(θ(j)), (14)
where π(θ) was fitted with MLE using (13). The basic idea here is that the estimates
based on observations from all banks are better then those obtained using smaller number
of observations available in the risk cell of a particular bank.
                 Risk 1 
)|(~,..., )1()1()1(2
)1(
1 ș 4xFXX
collective prior density )(șS
...
)1(4 )(K4
              Risk K
)|(~..., )()()(2
)(
1
KKKK
xFXX ș 4
Figure 1: Empirical Bayes approach – interpretation of the prior density pi(θ). Here, Θ(i) is the
risk profile of the i-th risk. Given Θ(i) = θ(i), the risk data X
(i)
1 ,X
(i)
2 , . . . are generated from the
distribution F (x|θ(i)). The risks are different having different risk profiles θ(i), but Θ(1), . . . ,Θ(K)
are distributed from the same common density pi(θ).
4.5 Poisson Frequency
Consider the annual number of events for a risk in one bank in year t modelled as a random
variable from the Poisson distribution Poisson (λ). The intensity parameter λ is not known
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and the Bayesian approach models it as a random variable Λ. Then the following model for
years t = 1, 2, . . . , T, T + 1 (where T + 1 corresponds to the next year) can be considered.
Model Assumptions 4.2
• Suppose that, given Λ = λ, the data N1, . . . , NT+1 are independent random variables
from the Poisson distribution, Poisson(λ):
Pr[Nt = n|λ] = e−λλ
n
n!
, λ ≥ 0. (15)
• The prior distribution for Λ is a gamma distribution, Gamma(α, β), with a density
π(λ) =
(λ/β)α−1
Γ(α)β
exp(−λ/β), λ > 0, α > 0, β > 0. (16)
That is, λ plays the role of θ and N = (N1, . . . , NT )
′ the role of X in (10).
Posterior. Given Λ = λ, under the Model Assumptions 4.2, N1, . . . , NT are independent
and their joint density, at N = n, is given by
h(n|λ) =
T∏
i=1
e−λ
λni
ni!
. (17)
Thus, using formula (10), the posterior density is
π(λ|n) ∝ (λ/β)
α−1
Γ(α)β
exp(−λ/β)
T∏
i=1
e−λ
λni
ni!
∝ λαT−1 exp(−λ/βT ), (18)
which is Gamma(αT , βT ), i.e. the same as the prior distribution with updated parameters
αT and βT given by:
α→ αT = α +
T∑
i=1
ni, β → βT = β
1 + β × T . (19)
Improper constant prior. It is easy to see that, if the prior is constant (improper prior),
i.e. π(λ|n) ∝ h(n|λ), then the posterior is Gamma(αT , βT ) with
αT = 1 +
T∑
i=1
ni, βT =
1
T
. (20)
In this case, the mode of the posterior π(λ|n) is λ̂MAPT = (αT − 1)βT = 1T
∑T
i=1 ni, which is
the same as the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) λ̂MLET of λ.
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Predictive distribution. Given data, the full predictive distribution for NT+1 is negative
binomial, NegBin(αT , 1/(1 + βT )):
Pr[NT+1 = m|N = n] =
∫
f(m|λ)π(λ|n)dλ
=
∫
e−λ
λm
m!
λαT−1
(βT )αTΓ(αT )
e−λ/βT dλ
=
(βT )
−αT
Γ(αT )m!
∫
e−(1+1/βT )λλαT+m−1dλ
=
Γ(αT +m)
Γ(αT )m!
(
1
1 + βT
)αT ( βT
1 + βT
)m
. (21)
It is assumed that given Λ = λ, NT+1 andN are independent. The expected number of events
over the next year, given past observations, E[NT+1|N ], i.e. mean of NegBin(αT , 1/(1 +
βT )) (which is also a mean of the posterior distribution in this case), allows for a good
interpretation as follows:
E[NT+1|N = n] = E[λ|N = n] = αTβT = βα +
∑T
i=1 ni
1 + β × T
= wT λ̂
MLE
T + (1− wT )λ0. (22)
Here,
• λ̂MLET = 1T
∑T
i=1 ni is the estimate of λ using the observed counts only;
• λ0 = αβ is the estimate of λ using a prior distribution only (e.g. specified by expert);
• wT = TβTβ+1 is the credibility weight in [0,1) used to combine λ0 and λ̂MLET .
Remarks 4.3
• As the number of observed years T increases, the credibility weight wT increases and
vice versa. That is, the more observations we have, the greater credibility weight we
assign to the estimator based on the observed counts, while the lesser credibility weight
is attached to the expert opinion estimate. Also, the larger the volatility of the expert
opinion (larger β), the greater credibility weight is assigned to observations.
• Recursive calculation of the posterior distribution is very simple. That is, consider
observed annual counts n1, n2, . . . , nk, . . . , where nk is the number of events in the
k-th year. Assume that the prior Gamma(α, β) is specified initially, then the posterior
π(λ|n1, . . . , nk) after the k-th year is a gamma distribution, Gamma(αk, βk), with αk =
α +
∑k
i=1 ni and βk = β/(1 + β × k). Observe that,
αk = αk−1 + nk, βk =
βk−1
1 + βk−1
. (23)
This leads to a very efficient recursive scheme, where the calculation of posterior distri-
bution parameters is based on the most recent observation and parameters of posterior
distribution calculated just before this observation.
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Estimating prior. Suppose that the annual frequency of the OpRisk losses N is modelled by
the Poisson distribution, Poisson(Λ = λ), and the prior density π(λ) for Λ is Gamma(α, β).
Then, E[N |Λ] = Λ and E[Λ] = α × β. The expert may estimate the expected number of
events but cannot be certain in the estimate. One could say that the expert’s “best” estimate
for the expected number of events corresponds to E[E[N |Λ]] = E[Λ]. If the expert specifies
E[Λ] and an uncertainty that the “true” λ for next year is within the interval [a,b] with a
probability Pr[a ≤ Λ ≤ b] = p (it may be convenient to set p = 2/3), then the equations
E[Λ] = α× β,
Pr[a ≤ Λ ≤ b] = p =
b∫
a
π(λ|α, β)dλ = F (G)α,β (b)− F (G)α,β (a)
(24)
can be solved numerically to estimate the structural parameters α and β. Here, F
(G)
α,β (·) is
the gamma distribution, Gamma(α, β), i.e.
F
(G)
α,β [y] =
y∫
0
xα−1
Γ(α)βα
exp
(
−x
β
)
dx.
In the insurance industry, the uncertainty for the “true” λ is often measured in terms
of the coefficient of variation, Vco[Λ] =
√
Var[Λ]/E[Λ]. Given the expert estimates for
E[Λ] = αβ and Vco[Λ] = 1/
√
α, the structural parameters α and β are easily estimated.
4.6 Numerical example
If the expert specifies E[Λ] = 0.5 and Pr[0.25 ≤ Λ ≤ 0.75] = 2/3, then we can fit a
prior distribution Gamma(α ≈ 3.407, β ≈ 0.147) by solving (24). Assume now that the
bank experienced no losses over the first year (after the prior distribution was estimated).
Then, using formulas (23), the posterior distribution parameters are α̂1 ≈ 3.407+0 = 3.407,
β̂1 ≈ 0.147/(1+0.147) ≈ 0.128 and the estimated arrival rate using the posterior distribution
is λ̂1 = α̂1×β̂1 ≈ 0.436. If during the next year no losses are observed again, then the posterior
distribution parameters are α̂2 = α̂1+0 ≈ 3.407, β̂2 = β̂1/(1+β̂1) ≈ 0.113 and λ̂2 = α̂2×β̂2 ≈
0.385. Subsequent observations will update the arrival rate estimator correspondingly using
formulas (23). Thus, starting from the expert specified prior, observations regularly update
(refine) the posterior distribution. The expert might reassess the posterior distribution at
any point in time (the posterior distribution can be treated as a prior distribution for the
next period), if new practices/policies were introduced in the bank that affect the frequency
of the loss. That is, if we have a new policy at time k, the expert may reassess the parameters
and replace α̂k and β̂k by α̂
∗
k and β̂
∗
k respectively.
In Figure 2, we show the posterior best estimate for the arrival rate λ̂k = α̂k × β̂k,
k = 1, . . . , 15 (with the prior distribution as in the above example), when the annual number
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of events Nk, k = 1, . . . , 25 are simulated from Poisson(λ = 0.6) and the realized samples
for 25 years are n1:25 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 2, 1, 1, 2, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0).
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Figure 2: The Bayesian and the standard maximum likelihood estimates of the arrival rate vs the
observation year; see Section 4.6 for details.
On the same figure, we show the standard maximum likelihood estimate of the arrival rate
λ̂MLEk =
1
k
∑k
i=1 ni. After approximately 8 years, the estimators are very close to each other.
However, for a small number of observed years, the Bayesian estimate is more accurate as it
takes the prior information into account. Only after 12 years do both estimators converge
to the true value of 0.6 (this is because the bank was very lucky to have no events during
the first four years). Note that for this example we assumed the prior distribution with a
mean equal to 0.5, which is different from the true arrival rate. Thus this example shows
that an initially incorrect prior estimator is corrected by the observations as they become
available. It is interesting to observe that, in year 14, the estimators become slightly different
again. This is because the bank was unlucky to experience event counts (1, 1, 2) in the years
(12, 13, 14). As a result, the maximum likelihood estimate becomes higher than the true
value, while the Bayesian estimate is more stable (smooth) with respect to the unlucky
years. If this example is repeated with different sequences of random numbers, then one
would observe quite different maximum likelihood estimates (for small k) and more stable
Bayesian estimates.
Finally we note that the standard deviation of the posterior distribution Gamma(αk, βk)
is large for small k. It is indicated by the error bars in Figure 2 and calculated as βk
√
αk.
4.7 The Lognormal LN (µ, σ) Severity
Assume that the loss severity for a risk in one bank is modelled as a random variable from
a lognormal distribution, LN (µ, σ), whose density is
f(x|µ, σ) = 1
x
√
2πσ2
exp
(
−(ln x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
. (25)
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This distribution often gives a good fit for operational loss data. Also, it belongs to a class of
heavy-tailed (subexponential) distributions. The parameters µ and σ are not known and the
Bayesian approach models these as a random variables Θµ and Θσ respectively. We assume
that the losses over the years t = 1, 2, . . . , T are observed and should be modelled for next
year T + 1. To simplify notation, we denote the losses over past T years as X1, . . . , Xn and
the future losses are Xn+1, . . . . Then the model can be structured as follows. For simplicity,
assume that σ is known and µ is unknown. The case where both σ and µ are unknown can
be found in Shevchenko [34, section 4.3.5].
Model Assumptions 4.4
• Suppose that, given σ and Θµ = µ, the data X1, . . . , Xn, . . . are independent random
variables from LN (µ, σ). That is, Yi = lnXi, i = 1, 2, . . . are distributed from the
normal distribution N (µ, σ).
• Assume that parameter σ is known and the prior distribution for Θµ is the normal
distribution, N (µ0, σ0). That is the prior density is
π(µ) =
1
σ0
√
2π
exp
(
−(µ − µ0)
2
2σ20
)
. (26)
Denote the losses over past years as X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
′ and corresponding log-losses as
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
′. Note that µ plays the role of θ in (10).
Posterior. Under the above assumptions, the joint density of the data over past years
(conditional on σ and Θµ = µ) at position Y = y is
h(y|µ, σ) =
n∏
i=1
1
σ
√
2π
exp
(
−(yi − µ)
2
2σ2
)
. (27)
Then, using formula (10), the posterior density can be written as
π(µ|y) ∝
exp
(
− (µ−µ0)2
2σ2
0
)
σ0
√
2π
n∏
i=1
exp
(
− (yi−µ)2
2σ2
)
σ
√
2π
∝ exp
(
−(µ− µ0,n)
2
2σ20,n
)
, (28)
that corresponds to a normal distribution, N (µ0,n, σ0,n), i.e. the same as the prior distribu-
tion with updated parameters
µ0 → µ0,n =
µ0 + ω
n∑
i=1
yi
1 + n× ω , (29)
σ20 → σ20,n =
σ20
1 + n× ω , where ω = σ
2
0/σ
2. (30)
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The expected value of Yn+1 (given past observations), E[Yn+1|Y = y], allows for a good
interpretation, as follows:
E[Yn+1|Y = y] = E[Θµ|Y = y] = µ0,n =
µ0 + ω
n∑
i=1
yi
1 + n× ω
= wnyn + (1− wn)µ0, (31)
where
• yn = 1n
n∑
i=1
yi is the estimate of µ using the observed losses only;
• µ0 is the estimate of µ using a prior distribution only (e.g. specified by expert);
• wn = nn+σ2/σ2
0
is the credibility weight in [0,1) used to combine µ0 and yn.
Remarks 4.5
• As the number of observations increases, the credibility weight w increases and vice
versa. That is, the more observations we have the greater weight we assign to the
estimator based on the observed counts and the lesser weight is attached to the expert
opinion estimate. Also, larger uncertainty in the expert opinion σ20 leads to a higher
credibility weight for observations and larger volatility of observations σ2 leads to a
higher credibility weight for expert opinions.
• The posterior distribution can be calculated recursively as follows. Consider the data
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk, . . . . Assume that the prior distribution, N (µ0, σ0), is specified initially,
then the posterior density π(µ|y1, . . . , yk) after the k-th event is the normal distribution
N (µ0,k, σ0,k) with
µ0,k =
µ0 + ω
k∑
i=1
yi
1 + k × ω , σ
2
0,k =
σ20
1 + k × ω ,
where ω = σ20/σ
2. It is easy to show that
µ0,k =
µ0,k−1 + ωk−1yk
1 + ωk−1
, σ20,k =
σ2ωk−1
1 + ωk−1
(32)
with ωk−1 = σ
2
0,k−1/σ
2. That is, calculation of the posterior distribution parameters can
be based on the most recent observation and the parameters of the posterior distribution
calculated just before this observation.
• Estimation of prior for the parameters of lognormal distribution is considered in Shevchenko
and Wu¨thrich [35].
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5 Bayesian Method to Combine Three Data Sources
In the previous section we showed how to combine two data sources: expert opinions and
internal data; or external data and internal data. In order to estimate the risk capital of
a bank and to fulfill the Basel II requirements, risk managers have to take into account
internal data, relevant external data (industry data) and expert opinions. The aim of this
section is to provide an example of methodology to be used to combine these three sources
of information. Here, we follow the approach suggested in Lambrigger et al [36]. As in the
previous section, we consider one risk cell only. In terms of methodology we go through the
following steps:
• In any risk cell, we model the loss frequency and the loss severity by parametric dis-
tributions (e.g. Poisson for the frequency or Pareto, lognormal, etc. for the severity).
For the considered bank, the unknown parameter vector θ (for example, the Poisson
parameter or the Pareto tail index) of these distributions has to be quantified.
• A priori, before we have any company specific information, only industry data are
available. Hence, the best prediction of our bank specific parameter θ is given by the
belief in the available external knowledge such as the provided industry data. This
unknown parameter of interest is modelled by a prior distribution (structural distribu-
tion) corresponding to a random vector Θ. The parameters of the prior distribution
(hyper-parameters) are estimated using data from the whole industry by, for example,
maximum likelihood estimation. If no industry data are available, the prior distribution
could come from a “super expert” that has an overview over all banks.
• The true bank specific parameter θ0 is treated as a realisation ofΘ. The prior distribu-
tion of a random vector Θ corresponds to the whole banking industry sector, whereas
θ stands for the unknown underlying parameter set of the bank being considered. Due
to the variability amongst banks, it is natural to model θ by a probability distribu-
tion. Note that Θ is random with known distribution, whereas θ0 is deterministic but
unknown.
• As time passes, internal data X = (X1, . . . , XK)′ as well as expert opinions ∆ =
(∆1, . . . ,∆M)
′ about the underlying parameter θ become available. This affects our
belief in the distribution ofΘ coming from external data only and adjust the prediction
of θ0. The more information on X and ∆ we have, the better we are able to predict
θ0. That is, we replace the prior density π(θ) by a conditional density of Θ given X
and ∆.
In order to determine the posterior density π(θ|x, δ), consider the joint conditional den-
sity of observations and expert opinions (given the parameter vector θ):
h(x, δ|θ) = h1(x|θ)h2(δ|θ), (33)
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where h1 and h2 are the conditional densities (given Θ = θ) ofX and∆, respectively. Thus
X and ∆ are assumed to be conditionally independent given Θ.
Remarks 5.1
• Notice that, in this way, we naturally combine external data information, π(θ), with
internal data X and expert opinion ∆.
• In classical Bayesian inference (as it is used, for example, in actuarial science), one
usually combines only two sources of information as described in the previous sections.
Here, we combine three sources simultaneously using an appropriate structure, that is,
equation (33).
• Equation (33) is quite a reasonable assumption. Assume that the true bank specific
parameter is θ0. Then, (33) says that the experts in this bank estimate θ0 (by their
opinion ∆) independently of the internal observations. This makes sense if the experts
specify their opinions regardless of the data observed. Otherwise we should work with
the joint distribution h(x, δ|θ).
We further assume that observations as well as expert opinions are conditionally independent
and identically distributed, given Θ = θ, so that
h1(x|θ) =
K∏
k=1
f1(xk|θ), (34)
h2(δ|θ) =
M∏
m=1
f2(δm|θ), (35)
where f1 and f2 are the marginal densities of a single observation and a single expert opinion,
respectively. We have assumed that all expert opinions are identically distributed, but this
can be generalised easily to expert opinions having different distributions.
Here, the unconditional parameter density π(θ) is the prior density, whereas the condi-
tional parameter density π(θ|x, δ) is the posterior density. Let h(x, δ) denote the uncon-
ditional joint density of the data X and expert opinions ∆. Then, it follows from Bayes’s
theorem that
h(x, δ|θ)π(θ) = π(θ|x, δ)h(x, δ). (36)
Note that the unconditional density h(x, δ) does not depend on θ and thus the posterior
density is given by
π(θ|x, δ) ∝ π(θ)
K∏
k=1
f1(xk|θ)
M∏
m=1
f2(δm|θ). (37)
For the purposes of OpRisk, it should be used to estimate the predictive distribution of
future losses.
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5.1 Modelling Frequency: Poisson Model
To model the loss frequency for OpRisk in a risk cell, consider the following model.
Model Assumptions 5.2 (Poisson-gamma-gamma) Assume that a risk cell in a bank
has a scaling factor V for the frequency in a specified risk cell (it can be the product of
several economic factors such as the gross income, the number of transactions or the number
of staff).
a) Let Λ ∼ Gamma(α0, β0) be a gamma distributed random variable with shape parameter
α0 > 0 and scale parameter β0 > 0, which are estimated from (external) market data.
That is, the density of Gamma(α0, β0), plays the role of π(θ) in (37).
b) Given Λ = λ, the annual frequencies, N1, . . . , NT , NT+1, where T+1 refers to next year,
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with Nt ∼ Poisson(V λ).
That is, f1(·|λ) in (37) corresponds to the probability mass function of a Poisson(V λ)
distribution.
c) A financial company has M expert opinions ∆m, 1 ≤ m ≤ M , about the intensity pa-
rameter Λ. Given Λ = λ, ∆m and Nt are independent for all t and m, and ∆1, . . . ,∆M
are independent and identically distributed with ∆m ∼ Gamma(ξ, λ/ξ), where ξ is a
known parameter. That is, f2(·|λ) corresponds to the density of a Gamma(ξ, λ/ξ)
distribution.
Remarks 5.3
• The parameters α0 and β0 in Model Assumptions 5.2 are hyper-parameters (parameters
for parameters) and can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method or the
method of moments.
• In Model Assumptions 5.2 we assume
E[∆m|Λ] = Λ, 1 ≤ m ≤M, (38)
that is, expert opinions are unbiased. A possible bias might only be recognised by the
regulator, as he alone has the overview of the whole market.
Note that the coefficient of variation of the conditional expert opinion ∆m|Λ is
Vco[∆m|Λ] = (Var[∆m|Λ)])1/2/E[∆m|Λ] = 1/
√
ξ,
and thus is independent of Λ. This means that ξ, which characterises the uncertainty in the
expert opinions, is independent of the true bank specific Λ. For simplicity, we have assumed
that all experts have the same conditional coefficient of variation and thus have the same
credibility. Moreover, this allows for the estimation of ξ as
ξ̂ = (µ̂/σ̂)2, (39)
24
where
µ̂ =
1
M
M∑
m=1
δm and σ̂
2 =
1
M − 1
M∑
m=1
(δm − µ̂)2, M ≥ 2.
In a more general framework the parameter ξ can be estimated, for example, by maximum
likelihood.
In the insurance practice ξ is often specified by the regulator denoting a lower bound for
expert opinion uncertainty; e.g. Swiss Solvency Test, see Swiss Financial Market Supervisory
Authority ( [37], appendix 8.4). If the credibility differs among the experts, then Vco[∆m|Λ]
should be estimated for all m, 1 ≤ m ≤ M . Admittedly, this may often be a challenging
issue in practice.
Remarks 5.4 This model can be extended to a model where one allows for more flexibility
in the expert opinions. For convenience, it is preferred that experts are conditionally inde-
pendent and identically distributed, given Λ. This has the advantage that there is only one
parameter, ξ, that needs to be estimated.
Using the notation from Section 5, the posterior density of Λ, given the losses up to year
K and the expert opinions of M experts, can be calculated. Denote the data over past years
as follows:
N = (N1, . . . , NT )
′,
∆ = (∆1, . . . ,∆M)
′.
Also, denote the arithmetic means by
N =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Nt, ∆ =
1
M
M∑
m=1
∆m, etc. (40)
Then, the posterior density is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 Under Model Assumptions 5.2, given loss information N = n and expert
opinion ∆ = δ, the posterior density of Λ is
π(λ|n, δ) = (ω/φ)
(ν+1)/2
2Kν+1(2
√
ωφ)
λνe−λω−λ
−1φ, (41)
with
ν = α0 − 1−Mξ + Tn,
ω = V T +
1
β0
, (42)
φ = ξMδ,
and
Kν+1(z) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
uνe−z(u+1/u)/2du. (43)
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Here, Kν(z) is a modified Bessel function of the third kind; see for instance Abramowitz and
Stegun ( [38], p. 375).
Proof 5.5 Model Assumptions 5.2 applied to (37) yield
π(λ|n, δ) ∝ λα0−1e−λ/β0
T∏
t=1
e−V λ
(V λ)nt
nt!
M∏
m=1
(δm)
ξ−1
(λ/ξ)ξ
e−δmξ/λ
∝ λα0−1e−λ/β0
T∏
t=1
e−V λλnt
M∏
m=1
(ξ/λ)ξe−δmξ/λ
∝ λα0−1−Mξ+Tn exp
(
−λ
(
V T +
1
β0
)
− 1
λ
ξMδ
)
.
Remarks 5.6
• A distribution with density (41) is known as the generalised inverse Gaussian distribu-
tion GIG(ω, φ, ν). This is a well-known distribution with many applications in finance
and risk management; see McNeil et al [6, p. 75 and p. 497].
• In comparison with the classical Poisson-gamma case of combining two sources of in-
formation (considered in Section 4.5), where the posterior is a gamma distribution, the
posterior π(λ|·) in (44) is more complicated. In the exponent, it involves both λ and
1/λ. Note that expert opinions enter via the term 1/λ only.
• Observe that the classical exponential dispersion family with associated conjugates (see
Chapter 2.5 in Bu¨hlmann and Gisler [32]) allows for a natural extension to GIG-
like distributions. In this sense the GIG distributions enlarge the classical Bayesian
inference theory on the exponential dispersion family.
For our purposes it is interesting to observe how the posterior density transforms when
new data from a newly observed year arrive. Let νk, ωk and φk denote the parameters for
the data (N1, . . . , Nk) after k accounting years. Implementation of the update processes is
then given by the following equalities (assuming that expert opinions do not change).
νk+1 = νk + nk+1,
ωk+1 = ωk + V, (44)
φk+1 = φk.
Obviously, the information update process has a very simple form and only the parameter ν
is affected by the new observation nk+1. The posterior density (44) does not change its type
every time new data arrive and hence, is easily calculated.
The moments of a GIG are not available in a closed form through elementary functions
but can be expressed in terms of Bessel functions. In particular, the posterior expected
number of losses is
E[Λ|N = n,∆ = δ] =
√
φ
ω
Kν+2(2
√
ωφ)
Kν+1(2
√
ωφ)
. (45)
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The mode of a GIG has a simple expression that gives the posterior mode
mode(Λ|N = n,∆ = δ) = 1
2ω
(ν +
√
ν2 + 4ωφ). (46)
It can be used as an alternative point estimator instead of the mean. Also, the mode of a GIG
differs only slightly from the expected value for large |ν|. A full asymptotic interpretation
of the Bayesian estimator (45) can be found Lambrigger et al [36] that shows the model
behaves as we would expect and require in practice.
5.2 Numerical example
A simple example, taken from Lambrigger et al [36, example 3.7], illustrates the above
methodology combining three data sources. It also extends numerical example from Sec-
tion 4.6, where two data sources are combined using classical Bayesian inference approach.
Assume that:
• External data (for example, provided by external databases or regulator) estimate the
intensity of the loss frequency (i.e. the Poisson parameter Λ), which has a prior gamma
distribution Λ ∼ Gamma(α0, β0), as E[Λ] = α0β0 = 0.5 and Pr[0.25 ≤ Λ ≤ 0.75] =
2/3. Then, the parameters of the prior are α0 ≈ 3.407 and β0 ≈ 0.147; see Section 4.6.
• One expert gives an estimate of the intensity as δ = 0.7. For simplicity, we con-
sider in this example one single expert only and hence, the coefficient of variation
is not estimated using (39), but given a priori (e.g. by the regulator): Vco[∆|Λ] =√
Var[∆|Λ]/E[∆|Λ] = 0.5, i.e. ξ = 4.
• The observations of the annual number of losses n1, n2, . . . are sampled from Poisson(0.6)
and are the same as in Section 4.6.
This means that a priori we have a frequency parameter distributed as Gamma(α0, β0) with
mean α0β0 = 0.5. The true value of the parameter λ for this risk in a bank is 0.6, that is, it
does worse than the average institution. However, our expert has an even worse opinion of
his institution, namely δ = 0.7. Now, we compare:
• the pure maximum likelihood estimate λ̂MLEk = 1k
∑k
i=1 ni;
• the Bayesian estimate (22), λ̂(2)k = E[Λ|N1 = n1, . . . , Nk = nk], without expert opinion;
• the Bayesian estimate derived in formula (45) λ̂(3)k = E[Λ|N1 = n1, . . . , Nk = nk,∆ =
δ], that combines internal data and expert opinions with the prior.
The results are plotted in Figure 3. The estimator λ̂
(3)
k shows a much more stable behaviour
around the true value λ = 0.6, due to the use of the prior information (market data) and
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Figure 3: (◦) The Bayes estimate λ̂(3)k , k = 1, . . . , 15, combines the internal data simulated from
Poisson(0.6), external data giving E[Λ] = 0.5, and expert opinion δ = 0.7. It is compared with the
Bayes estimate λ̂
(2)
k (△), that combines external data and internal data, and the classical maximum
likelihood estimate λ̂MLEk (•). See Example 5.2 for details.
the expert opinions. Given adequate expert opinions, λ̂
(3)
k clearly outperforms the other
estimators, particularly if only a few data points are available.
One could think that this is only the case when the experts’ estimates are appropriate.
However, even if experts fairly under- (or over-) estimate the true parameter λ, the method
presented here performs better for our dataset than the other mentioned methods, when
a few data points are available. The above example yields a typical picture observed in
numerical experiments that demonstrates that the Bayes estimator (45) is often more suitable
and stable than maximum likelihood estimators based on internal data only. Note that in
this example the prior distribution as well as the expert opinion do not change over time.
However, as soon as new information is available or when new risk management tools are in
place, the corresponding parameters may be easily adjusted.
Remarks 5.7 In this section, we considered the situation where Λ is the same for all years
t = 1, 2, . . . . However, in general, the evolution of Λt, can be modelled as having determin-
istic (trend, seasonality) and stochastic components, the case when Λt is purely stochastic
and distributed according to a gamma distribution is considered in Peters, et al [39].
5.3 Lognormal Model for Severities
In general, one can use the methodology summarised by equation (37) to develop a model
combining external data, internal data and expert opinion for estimation of the severity. For
illustration purposes, this section considers the lognormal severity model.
Consider modelling severities X1, . . . , XK , . . . using the lognormal distribution LN (µ, σ),
where X = (X1, . . . , XK)
′ are the losses over past T years. Here, we take an approach
considered in Section 4.7, where µ is unknown and σ is known. The unknown µ is treated
28
under the Bayesian approach as a random variable Θµ. Then combining external data,
internal data and expert opinions can be accomplished using the following model.
Model Assumptions 5.8 (Lognormal-normal-normal) Let us assume the following sever-
ity model for a risk cell in one bank:
a) Let Θµ ∼ N (µ0, σ0) be a normally distributed random variable with parameters µ0, σ0,
which are estimated from (external) market data, i.e. π(θ) in (37) is the density of
N (µ0, σ0).
b) Given Θµ = µ, the losses X1, X2, . . . are conditionally independent with a common
lognormal distribution: Xk∼LN (µ, σ), where σ is assumed known. That is, f1(·|µ) in
(37) corresponds to the density of a LN (µ, σ) distribution.
c) The financial company has M experts with opinions ∆m, 1 ≤ m ≤ M , about Θµ.
Given Θµ = µ, ∆m and Xk are independent for all m and k, and ∆1, . . . ,∆M are
independent with a common normal distribution: ∆m∼N (µ, ξ), where ξ is a parameter
estimated using expert opinion data. That is, f2(·|µ) corresponds to the density of a
N (µ, ξ) distribution.
Remarks 5.9
• For M ≥ 2, the parameter ξ can be estimated by the standard deviation of δm:
ξ̂ =
(
1
M − 1
M∑
m=1
(δm − δ)2
)1/2
. (47)
• The hyper-parameters µ0 and σ0 are estimated from market data, for example, by
maximum likelihood estimation or by the method of moments.
• In practice one often uses an ad-hoc estimate for σ, which usually is based on expert
opinion only. However, one could think of a Bayesian approach for σ, but then an ana-
lytical formula for the posterior distribution in general does not exist and the posterior
needs then to be calculated numerically, for example, by MCMC methods.
Under Model Assumptions 5.8, the posterior density is given by
π(µ|x, δ) ∝ 1
σ0
√
2π
exp
(
−(µ− µ0)
2
2σ20
) K∏
k=1
1
σ
√
2π
exp
(
−(ln xk − µ)
2
2σ2
)
M∏
m=1
1
ξ
√
2π
exp
(
−(δm − µ)
2
2ξ2
)
∝ exp
[
−
(
(µ− µ0)2
2σ20
+
K∑
k=1
(ln xk − µ)2
2σ2
+
M∑
m=1
(δm − µ)2
2ξ2
)]
∝ exp
[
−(µ− µ̂)
2
2σ̂2
]
, (48)
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with
σ̂2 =
(
1
σ20
+
K
σ2
+
M
ξ2
)−1
,
and
µ̂ = σ̂2 ×
(
µ0
σ20
+
1
σ2
K∑
k=1
ln xk +
1
ξ2
M∑
m=1
δm
)
.
In summary, we derived the following theorem (also see Lambrigger et al [36]). That is, the
posterior distribution of Θµ, given loss information X = x and expert opinion ∆ = δ, is a
normal distribution N (µ̂, σ̂) with
σ̂2 =
(
1
σ20
+
K
σ2
+
M
ξ2
)−1
and
µ̂ = E[Θµ|X = x,∆ = δ] = ω1µ0 + ω2ln x+ ω3δ, (49)
where ln x = 1
K
∑K
k=1 ln xk and the credibility weights are
ω1 = σ̂
2/σ20, ω2 = σ̂
2K/σ2, ω3 = σ̂
2M/ξ2.
This yields a natural interpretation. The more credible the information, the higher is the
credibility weight in (49) – as expected from an appropriate model for combining internal
observations, relevant external data and expert opinions.
6 Nonparametric Bayesian approach
Typically, under the Bayesian approach, we assume that there is unknown distribution un-
derlying observations x1, . . . , xn and this distribution is parametrized by θ. Then we place a
prior distribution on the parameter θ and try to infer the posterior of θ given observations
x1, . . . , xn. Under the nonparametric approach, we do not make assumption that underlying
loss process generating distribution is parametric; we put prior on the distribution directly
and find the posterior of the distribution given data which is combining of the prior with
empirical data distribution.
One of the most popular Bayesian nonparametric models is based on Dirichlet process
introduced in Ferguson [40]. The Dirichlet process represents a probability distribution of
the probability distributions. It can be specified in terms of a base distribution H(x) and
a scalar concentration parameter α > 0 and denoted as DP (α,H). For example, assume
that we model severity distribution F (x) which is unknown and modelled as random at each
point x using DP (α,H). Then, the mean value of F (x) is the base distribution H(x) and
variance of F (x) is H(x)(1 − H(x))/(α + 1). That is, as the concentration parameter α
increases, the true distribution is getting closer to the base distribution H(x). Each draw
from Dirichlet process is a distribution function and for x1 < x2 < · · · < xk, the distribution
of
F (x1), F (x2)− F (x1), . . . , 1− F (xk)
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is a k + 1 multivariate Dirichlet distribution
Dir(αH(x1), α(H(x2)−H(x1)), . . . , α(1−H(xk)))
formally defined as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Dirichlet distribution) A d-variate Dirichlet distribution is denoted as
Dir(α1, α2, . . . , αd), where αi > 0. The random vector (Q1, Q2, . . . , Qd) has a Dirichlet
distribution if its density function is
f(q1, q2, . . . , qd−1) =
Γ(α1 + · · ·+ αd)∏d
i=1 Γ(αi)
d∏
i=1
qαi−1i , (50)
where qi > 0 and q1 + · · ·+ qd = 1.
There are several formal definitions of Dirichlet processes; for detailed description see
Ghosh and Ramamoorthi [41]. For the purposes of this book, here we just present few im-
portant results that can be easily adopted for OpRisk. In particular, the ith marginal
distribution of Dir(α1, . . . , αd) is Beta(αi, α0 − αi), where α0 = α1 + · · · + αd. Thus
the marginal distribution of the Dirichlet process DP (α,H) is beta distribution F (x) ∼
Beta(αH(x), α(1−H(x))), i.e. explicitly it has the Beta density
Pr[F (x) ∈ dy] = Γ(α)
Γ(αH(x))Γ(α(1−H(x)))y
αH(x)(1− y)α(1−H(x))−1dy, (51)
where Γ(·) is a gamma function.
If the prior distribution for F (x) is DP (α,H), then after observing x1, . . . , xn, the pos-
terior for F (x) is
DP
(
α+ n,
α
α + n
H(x) +
n
α + n
1
n
∑
1xi≤x
)
. (52)
In other words, Dirichlet process is a conjugate prior with respect to empirical sample
distribution; in posterior, our unknown distribution F (x) will have updated concentration
parameter α + n and updated base distribution
H˜(x) =
α
α + n
H(x) +
n
α + n
1
n
∑
1xi≤x, (53)
which is a weighted sum of the prior base distribution and empirical distribution with the
weights α/(α + n) and n/(α + n) respectively. The modeller can choose H(x) as an ex-
pert opinion on distribution F (x), then posterior estimate of the F (x) after observing data
x1, . . . , xn will be given by H˜(x) in (53).
Remarks 6.2
• As new data are collected, the posterior distribution converges to the empirical distri-
bution that itself converges to the true distribution of F (x).
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• The larger value of α, the less impact new data will have on the posterior estimate of
F (x); if α = 0, the posterior distribution will simply be the empirical distribution of
the data.
• The concentration parameter α can be interpreted as an“effective sample size associated
with the prior estimate. In assigning the value of c, the modeler should attempt to
quantify the level of information contained in the scenario estimates, as measured by
the equivalent amount of data that would provide a similar level of confidence. The
modeller can also estimate α from a likely interval range of severities or frequencies
(i.e. from the variance of the possible distribution). Cope [42] suggests that given the
rarity of the scenarios considered, the assigned value of α will likely be low, often less
than ten and possibly as low as one.
Numerical Example. Assume that expert provides estimates in USD millions for a risk
severity as follows. If loss occurs, then the probability to exceed 10, 30, 50 and 120 are 0.9,
0.5, 0.25 and 0.1 respectively, and the maximum possible loss is USD 600 million. That
is, probability distribution H(x) at points (0, 10, 30, 50, 120, 600) is (0, 0.1, 0.5, 0.75,
0.9, 1). It is presented in Figure 4 with linear interpolation between specified distribution
points. If we choose the prior for the unknown severity distribution F (x) as DP (α,H(x))
with concentration parameter α = 10, then expected value for F (x) from the prior is H(x)
and bounds for F (x) for each x can be calculated from the marginal beta distribution (51).
For example, the lower and upper bounds in Figure 4 correspond to 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles
of the beta distribution Beta(αH(x), α(1−H(x))), i.e. will contain the true value of F (x)
with probability 0.8 for each x. Now, assume that we observe the actual losses 20, 30, 50, 80,
120, 170, 220, and 280 all in USD million. The posterior mean of F (x) combining scenario
and data is easily calculated using (53) and presented in Figure 5 along with the empirical
data and scenario distribution.
7 Combining using Dempster-Shafer structures
Often risk assessment includes situations where there is little information on which to eval-
uate a probability or information is nonspecific, ambiguous, or conflicting. In this case one
can work with bounds on probability. For example, this idea has been developed in Wal-
ley and Fine [43], Berleant [44] and there are suggestions that the idea has its roots from
Boole [45]. Williamson and Downs [46] introduced interval-type bounds on cumulative dis-
tribution functions called probability boxes or p-boxes. They also described algorithms to
compute arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication and division) on pairs
of p-boxes.
The method of reasoning with uncertain information known as Dempster-Shafer theory
of evidence was suggested in Dempster [47,48] and Shafer [49]. A special rule to combine the
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Figure 4: Dirichlet marginal bounds for scenario severity distribution.
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Figure 5: Combining scenario severity distribution with empirical distribution of the observed
data.
33
evidence from different sources was formulated in Dempster [48]; it is somewhat controversial
and there are many modifications to the rule such as in Yager [50, 51].
For a good summary on the methods for obtaining Dempster-Shafer structures and “p-
boxes”, and aggregation methods handling a conflict between the objects from different
sources, see Ferson et al [52]. The use of p-boxes and Dempster-Shafer structures in risk
analyses offers many significant advantages over a traditional probabilistic approach. Ferson
et al [52] lists the following practical problems faced by analysts that can be resolved using
these methods: imprecisely specified distributions, poorly known or even unknown depen-
dencies, non-negligible measurement uncertainty, non-detects or other censoring in measure-
ments, small sample size, inconsistency in the quality of input data, model uncertainty, and
non-stationarity (non-constant distributions).
It is emphasized in Walley [53] that the use of imprecise probabilities does not require one
to assume the actual existence of any underlying distribution function. This approach could
be useful in risk analyses even when the underlying stochastic processes are nonstationary
or could never, even in principle, be identified to precise distribution functions. Oberkampf
et al [54] and Oberkampf [55] demonstrated how the theory could be used to model un-
certainty in engineering applications of risk analysis stressing that the use of p-boxes and
Dempster-Shafer structures in risk analyses offers many significant advantages over a tradi-
tional probabilistic approach.
These features are certainly attractive for OpRisk, especially for combining expert opin-
ions, and were applied for OpRisk in Sakalo and Delasey [56]. At the same time, some writers
consider these methods as unnecessary elaboration that can be handled within the Bayesian
paradigm through Baysian robustness (section 4.7 in Berger [33]). Also, it might be difficult
to justify application of Dempster’s rule (or its other versions) to combine statistical bounds
for empirical data distribution with exact bounds for expert opinions.
7.1 Dempster-Shafer structures and p-boxes
A Dempster-Shafer structure on the real line is similar to a discrete distribution except that
the locations where the probability mass resides are sets of real values (focal elements) rather
than points. The correspondence of probability masses associated with the focal elements is
called the basic probability assignment. This is analogous to the probability mass function
for an ordinary discrete probability distribution. Unlike a discrete probability distribution
on the real line, where the mass is concentrated at distinct points, the focal elements of a
Dempster-Shafer structure may overlap one another, and this is the fundamental difference
that distinguishes Dempster-Shafer theory from traditional probability theory. Dempster-
Shafer theory has been widely studied in computer science and artificial intelligence, but
has never achieved complete acceptance among probabilists and traditional statisticians,
even though it can be rigorously interpreted as classical probability theory in a topologically
coarser space.
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Definition 7.1 (Dempster-Shafer structure) A finite Dempster-Shafer structure on the
real line R is probability assignment, which is a mapping
m : 2R → [0; 1],
where m(∅) = 0; m(ai) = pi for focal elements ai ⊆ R, i = 1, 2, . . . , n; and m(D) = 0
whenever D 6= ai for all i, such that 0 < pi and p1 + · · ·+ pn = 1.
For convenience, we will assume that the focal elements ai are closed intervals [xi, yi]. Then
implementation of a Dempster-Shafer structure will require 3n numbers; one for each pi; and
xi and yi for each corresponding focal element.
Remarks 7.2 Note that 2R denotes a power set. The power set of a set S is the set of all
subsets of S including the empty set ∅ and S itself. If S is a finite set with K elements then
the number of elements in its power set is 2K. For example, if S is the set {x, y}, then the
power set is {∅, x, y, {x, y}}.
The upper and lower probability bounds can be defined for Dempster-Shafer structure.
These are called plausibility and belief functions defined as follows.
Definition 7.3 (Plausibility function) The plausibility function corresponding to a Dempster-
Shafer structure m(A) is the sum of all masses associated with sets that overlap with or merely
touch the set b ⊆ R
P ls(b) =
∑
ai∩b6=∅
m(ai),
which is the sum over i such that ai ∩ b 6= ∅.
Definition 7.4 (Belief function) The belief function corresponding to a Dempster-Shafer
structure m(A) is the sum of all masses associated with sets that are subsets of b ⊆ R
Bel(b) =
∑
ai⊆b
m(ai),
which is the sum over i such that ai ⊆ b.
Obviously, Bel(b) ≤ P ls(b). Also, if one of the structures (either Dempster-Shafer structure,
or Bel or P ls) is known then the other two can be calculated. Considering sets of all real
numbers less than or equal to z, it is easy to get upper and lower bounds for a probability
distribution of a random real-valued quantity characterized by a finite Dempster-Shafer
structure.
Consider Dempster-Shafer structure with focal elements that are closed intervals [xi, yi].
We can specify it by listing focal elements the focal elements and their associated probability
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masses pi as {([x1, y1], p1), ([x2, y2], p2), . . . , ([xn, yn], pn)}. Then the left bound (cumulative
plausibility function) and the right bound (cumulative belief function) are
FU(z) =
∑
xi≤z
pi; F
L(z) =
∑
yi≤z
pi. (54)
respectively. These functions are non-decreasing and right continuous functions from real
numbers onto the interval [0, 1] and FL(z) ≤ FU(z), i.e. proper distribution functions.
They define the so-called p-box [FL(z), FU(z)] that can be defined without any reference to
Dempster-Shafer structure.
Definition 7.5 (probability box or p-box) p-box is a set of all probability distributions
F (x) such that FL ≤ F (x) ≤ FU(x), where FL(x) and FU(x) are nondecreasing functions
from the real line into [0, 1]. It is denoted as [FL, FU ].
That is, we say that [FL, FU ] is a p-box of a random variable X whose distribution F (x) is
unknown except that FL ≤ F (x) ≤ FU(x).
Example 7.6 Consider the following Dempster-Shafer structure with three focal elements
that have the same probability 1/3, i.e.
Structure A =

[x1 = 5, y1 = 20]; p1 = 1/3
[x2 = 10, y2 = 25]; p2 = 1/3
[x3 = 15, y3 = 30]; p3 = 1/3
Plausibility and belief functions are easily calculated using (54) respectively and presented by
structure A in Figure 6.
7.2 Dempster’s rule
The central method in the Dempster-Shafer theory is Dempsters rule for combining evidence
(Shafer [49]; Dempster [47]). In some situations, this rule produces counterintuitive results
and various alternative versions of the rule have been suggested such as Yager [51]. In
this section, we briefly describe only the original Dempsters rule which is used to combine
evidence obtained from two or more independent sources for the same quantity in question
(e.g. expert opinions about a specific risk). A considerably more extensive review of this
literature is available in Sentz and Ferson [57].
Definition 7.7 (Dempsters rule) The combination of two independent Dempster-Shafer
structures m1(A) and m2(B) with focal elements ai and bj respectively is another Dempster-
Shafer structure with probability assignment
m(∅) = 0; m(c) = 1
1−K
∑
ai∩bj=c
m1(ai)m2(bj) for c 6= ∅, (55)
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i.e. the sum over all i and j such that intersection of ai and bj is equal to c, where
K =
∑
ai∩bj=∅
m1(ai)m2(bj) (56)
is the mass associated with the conflict present in the combining evidence.
Example 7.8 Consider two independent Dempster-Shafer structures A and B with focal
elements ai and bj respectively
Structure A =

[5, 20], 1
3
[10, 25], 1
3
[15, 30], 1
3
and Structure B =

[10, 25], 1
3
[15, 30], 1
3
[22, 35], 1
3
The only combination of focal elements between these two structures that has no intersection
is a1 = [5, 20] with b3 = [22, 35]. Thus the conflict of information in (56) is K =
1
3
1
3
= 1
9
.
Using Dempster rule (55) to combine structures A and B, we obtain the following structure
C:{
([10, 20],
1
8
); ([15, 20],
1
8
); ([10, 25],
1
8
; ([15, 25],
1
4
); ([22, 25],
1
8
); ([15, 30],
1
8
); ([22, 30],
1
8
)
}
.
Note that intersection c4 = [15, 25] is produced by two combinations: a2 with b2; and a3 with
b1. Thus c4 has probability (
1
3
1
3
+ 1
3
1
3
)/(1−K) = 1/4 while all other elements of structure C
are produced by one combination and have probability 1
3
1
3
/(1−K) = 1
8
each. Plausibility and
belief functions of all structures are easily calculated using (54 and presented in Figure 6 for
all structures. elements.
7.3 Intersection method
If the estimates to be aggregated represent claims that the quantity has to be within some
limits, then intersection method is perhaps the most natural kind of aggregation. The idea
is simply to use the smallest region that all estimates agree. For example, if we know for
sure that a true value of the quantity a is within the interval x = [1, 3], and we also know
from another source of evidence, that a is also within the interval y = [2, 4], then we may
conclude that a is certainly within the interval x ∩ y = [2, 3].
The most general definition of intersection can be specified in terms of probability boxes.
If there are K p-boxes F1 = [F
L
1 , F
U
1 ], . . . , FK = [F
L
K , F
U
K ], then their intersection is a p-box
[FL, FU ], where
FU = min(FU1 , . . . , F
U
K ), F
L = max(FL1 , . . . , F
L
K) (57)
if FL(x) ≤ FU(x) for all x. This operation is used when the analyst is highly confident
that each of multiple p-boxes encloses the distribution of the quantity in question. This
formulation extends to Dempster-Shafer structures easily. The cumulative plausibility and
belief functions of such structures form p-boxes.
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Figure 6: Plausibility and belief functions for Dempster-Shafer structures in example in Section
7.2. Focal elements of the structure are indicated by arrows. Structure C is a result of combining
strcutures A and B via Dempster’s rule.
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Despite its several desirable properties, the intersection has only limited application for
aggregation in OpRisk because it requires a very strong assumption that the individual
estimates are each absolutely correct. It is certainly not recommended to the cases if any of
the experts might be wrong. In practice, wrong opinions can be more typical than correct
ones. For more detailed discussion and examples, see Ferson et al [52].
7.4 Envelope method
In the previous section on aggregation via intersection, it is assumed that all the estimates to
be aggregated are completely reliable. If the analyst is confident only that at least one of the
estimates encloses the quantity, but does not know which estimate, the method of enveloping
can be used to aggregate the estimates into one reliable characterization. In general, when
the estimates to be aggregated represent claims about the true value of a quantity and these
estimates have uncertain reliability, enveloping is often an appropriate aggregation method.
The idea is to identify the region where any estimate might be possible as the aggregation
result. In particular, if one expert says that the value is 1 and another expert says that
it is 2, we might decide to use the interval [1, 2] as the aggregated estimate. If there are
K p-boxes F1 = [F
L
1 , F
U
1 ], . . . , FK = [F
L
K , F
U
K ], then their envelope is defined to be a p-box
[FL, FU ] where
FU = max(FU1 , . . . , F
U
K ), F
L = min(FL1 , . . . , F
L
K) (58)
This operation is always defined. It is used when the analyst knows that at least one of
multiple p-boxes describes the distribution of the quantity in question. This formulation
extends to Dempster-Shafer structures easily. The cumulative plausibility and belief func-
tions of such structures form p-boxes. The result of aggregating these p-boxes can then
be translated back into a Dempster-Shafer structure by canonical discretization. However,
enveloping is sensitive to claims of general ignorance. This means that if only one expert
provides an inconclusive opinion, it will determine the result of the aggregation. The overall
result of enveloping will be as broad as the broadest input. The naive approach to omit any
inconclusive estimates before calculating the envelope will not be sufficient in practice be-
cause any estimate that is not meaningless but just very wide can swamp all other estimates.
Again, for more detailed discussion, the reader is referred to Ferson et al [52].
7.5 Bounds for empirical data distribution
P-boxes and Dempster-Shafer structures can be constructed for empirical data using distri-
bution free bounds around an empirical distribution function (Kolmogorov [58,59]; Smirnov
[60]). Similar to the confidence intervals around a single number, these are bounds on a sta-
tistical distribution as a whole. As the number of samples increases, these confidence limits
would converge to the empirical distribution function. Given independent samples X1, . . .Xn
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from unknown continuous distribution F (x), the empirical distribution of the data is
Fn(x) =
1
n
n∑
1
1Xi≤x.
The lower and upper bounds (referred to as Kolmogorov-Smirnov bounds) for the distribution
F (x) can be calculated as
FLn = max(0, Fn(x)−D(α, n)); FUn = min(1, Fn(x) +D(α, n)), (59)
where D(α, n) is a critical value for the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic Dn at the
confidence level 100(1− α)% and sample size n, i.e.
Pr[Dn ≤ D(α, n)] = 1− α, where Dn = sup
x
|Fn(x)− F (x)| .
The tabulated values forD(α, n) as well as a numerical approximations can be found in Miller
[61]. For example, for sample size n = 10 and α = 0.05 (i.e. 95% confidence level), D(α, n) =
0.40925. Note that typically, Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics Dn is used for goodness-of-fit
testing to compare a sample with a reference probability distribution. The null hypothesis
that sample is from F (x) is rejected at level α if Dn exceeds critical value D(α, n).
Theoretically, the left tail of the KS upper limit extends to negative infinity. But, of
course, the smallest possible value might be limited by other considerations. For instance,
there might be a theoretical lower limit at zero. If so, we could use this fact to truncate
the upper (left) bound at zero. The right tail of the lower limit likewise extends to positive
infinity. Sometimes it may be reasonable to select some value at which to truncate the largest
value of a quantity too.
Example 7.9 Assume that we have the following iid samples
(3.5; 4; 6; 8.1; 9.2; 12.3; 14.8; 16.9; 18; 20)
Also assume that the lower bound for samples is zero and the upper bound is 30. Then
Kolmogorov-Smirnov bounds at 80% confidence are calculated using (59) and presented in
Figure 7.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov bounds make no distributional assumptions, but they do require
that the samples are independent and identically distributed. In practice, an independence
assumption is sometimes hard to justify. Kolmogorov-Smirnov bounds are widely used in
probability theory and risk analyses, for instance as a way to express the reliability of the
results of a simulation.
Formally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is valid for continuous distribution functions.
Also, in the discrete case, Kolmogorov-Smirnov bounds are conservative, i.e. these bounds
can be used in the case of discrete distributions but may not represent best possible bounds.
The confidence value α should be chosen such that the analyst believes the p-box contains
the true distribution. The same hypothesis must also be assumed for the construction of the
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov bounds for empirical distribution
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Figure 7: Kolmogorov-Smirnov bounds for empirical distribution; for details see Example 7.9.
p-box from expert estimates. However, note that a p-box defined by Kolmogorov-Smirnov
confidence limits is fundamentally different from the sure bounds. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
bounds are not certain bounds but statistical ones. The associated statistical statement is
that 95% (or whatever is specified by α) of the time the true distribution will be within the
bounds. It is not completely clear how to combine the Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-box with the
expert specified p-box; the choices of the upper limit and confidence level α for Kolmogorov-
Smirnov bounds can be problematic.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we reviewed several methods suggested in the literature for combining differ-
ent data sources required for the LDA under Basel II requirements. We emphasized that
Bayesian methods can be well suited for modeling OpRisk. In particular, Bayesian frame-
work is convenient to combine different data sources (internal data, external data and expert
opinions) and to account for the relevant uncertainties. There are many other methodolog-
ical challenges in the LDA implementation such as modelling dependence, data truncation
and estimation which are under the hot debate in the literature; for a recent review, the
reader is referred to Shevchenko [16].
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